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CIGARETTE LITIGATION AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
DID SOMEONE WIN THE WAR OR
HAVE THE BATTLE LINES JUST BEEN DRAWN?
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992)
Lawrence A. Schemmel
I. INTRODUCTION*
The average American consumer is bombarded daily with advertisements from
network and cable television, radio, billboards, newsprint, and home mailings that
try to sell everything from Lean Cuisine to Calvin Klein Jeans. Since the begin-
ning of newsprint media, and more recently since the advent of radio and televi-
sion, the consuming American public has been exposed to ever-increasing efforts
of advertisers and manufacturers to sell their products. Toward this end, manufac-
turers sponsor public and private events, athletic contests, and media shows, to
name a few.
During the early 1950s, one of the more popular radio shows of the time was
Arthur Godfrey and His Friends. The show was sponsored, in part, by the Chester-
field brand of cigarettes, manufactured by Liggett Group, Inc. 1 The January 8,
1953, show promoted Chesterfield brand cigarettes to its listeners (text read by
Mr. Godfrey):
[A] medical specialist is making . . . examinations ... every two months. Now
they've gone, I think, as far as 8 months. That's so far, 8 months. What they did was
get a group of people from various walks of life . . . . And 45% of this group
smoked Chesterfields for an average of over 10 years. After 8 months, the medical
specialist reports he has observed no adverse effects whatever on the noses, the
throat, the sinuses, the ears, or other organs from smoking Chesterfields. That's-
that seems to me to [mean] mildness, real mildness. You've been wondering about
whether or not smoking does things to you which you don't want to do? Well, why
don't you smoke Chesterfields. Here's a guy watchin' a lot of people and nothin' hap-
pened to them yet. We've been smokin' 'em a long time. Of course, we were always
this way. You can't judge by us. But they're good, very fine, and I never recall seein'
* Editor's Note: Cites throughout this Note refer to the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act is codified within the
Cigarette Labeling Act. For clarity, the various provisions of the acts relied upon in cases cited throughout this
Note have been referred to the initial citation contained in footnote three which contains the subsequent history of
both acts. When necessary, specific references to sections and volume editions have been added to subsequent
citations.
1. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 549 (3d Cir. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2608 (1992).
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on anybody's gravestone - He Smoked Too Much, did you? I never did. So Chester-
field's for you, regular or king size.2
Mr. Godfrey probably never realized the power of his and others' radio promo-
tions of cigarettes on the American public. The truth is that use of the product he
endorsed has created litigation of considerable magnitude, with high stakes on
both sides. The issue of liability of cigarette manufacturers to smokers, notwith-
standing the manufacturers' compliance with federal warning requirements, is one
that has sparked controversy between two powerful, opposing factions. The aver-
age American has most likely at least been exposed to cigarettes and is somewhat
familiar with tobacco smoke's potential physical effects on the human body, even if
one has never smoked. The current debate concerning liability for those effects fo-
cuses on interpretation of a 1965 federal statute and a 1969 amended version, and
whether these statutes allow state common law tort claims for physical damages to
smokers from smoking cigarettes, despite manufacturers' warning labels.'
The United States Supreme Court faced this issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.4 Prior to this decision, certain federal courts held that state law claims were
preempted by federal statutes, thus disallowing claims for damages. . Other state
courts determined that these federal statutes did not preempt common law claims,
thus allowing the claims to stand.6 The Supreme Court, in resolving the conflict,
determined that state law damage actions based on failure to warn and omissions
or inclusions in advertising were preempted. 7 It also concluded that claims based
on express warranty, intentional fraud, misrepresentation, or conspiracy were not
preempted.8 The decision was based on congressional intent and statutory inter-
pretation of certain sections of each of the two statutes involved.9 In remanding the
case for determination of the merits of those claims not preempted,1" the Court
may have promoted continued litigation in this particular case. But more impor-
tantly, it may also have struck a perfect balance between protecting the interests of
both parties to the controversy by defining the guidelines of whatmust be proven to
recover in products liability claims involving these and other similar products.
2. Id. at 550 n.2.
3. Id. at 546 (discussing Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282,
282-84 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1339 (Supp. III 1965-67)) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992) amended by Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat.
87, 87-89 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970)) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
1331-1340 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) [hereinafter Cigarette Act].
4. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
5. See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Palmer v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
6. See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
7. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625.
8. Id. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 does not preempt any state law damage
claims. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). The 1969 Act does not preempt claims based on express
warranty, intentional fraud, misrepresentation, or conspiracy. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
9. Id. at 2616-25.
10. Id. at 2625.
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Section II of this Note will discuss the factual background of Cipollone and
prior lower court decisions. Next, it will show how the Court supported its deci-
sion in the instant case by its interpretation of prior Supreme Court cases, federal
statutory law, and congressional intent. Then the Note will discuss the instant
case, concentrating on the basis of the Court's holding, followed by an analysis of
the Court's reasoning and possible implications of the Court's opinion. Finally, the
Note will summarize the effect of the Cipollone decision, specifically on the de-
bate over cigarette manufacturers' liability to consumers and, more generally, on
the issues of liability claims involving similar controversial products.
II. FACTS
Rose D. Cipollone was born in 1925 and began smoking Chesterfield brand cig-
arettes in 1942.1" In 1955, Mrs. Cipollone stopped smoking Chesterfields and
switched to L & M filter cigarettes, also made by Liggett. 2 In 1968, she started
smoking the Virginia Slims brand, made by Philip Morris.13 In the early 1970s,
Mrs. Cipollone began smoking Parliament, another Philip Morris cigarette.14
Then in 1974, she switched brands from Parliament to True, made by Lorillard,
Inc.15 Except during her first pregnancy in the 1940s, Mrs. Cipollone smoked be-
tween one and two packs of cigarettes each day from 1942 until the early 1980s.16
In 1981, Mrs. Cipollone was diagnosed with lung cancer but continued to
smoke against her doctor's advice until June, 1982, when one lung was removed. 
17
She secretly continued to smoke until she quit in 1983 when her cancer was diag-
nosed as being terminal.18
In August, 1983, Rose and her husband, Antonio Cipollone, filed suit in federal
district court in New Jersey against Liggett, Philip Morris, and Lorillard.19 The
complaint sought damages for suffering and monetary costs from Mrs. Cipollone's
lung cancer allegedly caused by smoking the defendants' cigarettes.2 Mrs. Cipol-
lone died in October, 1984, before the case went to trial.2" Mr. Cipollone, as his
wife's executor, and on his own behalf, filed a third amended complaint in May of
11. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 548 (3d Cir. 1990), affd in part, rev'd inpart, 112 S. Ct.
2608 (1992).
12. Id. at 550.






19. Id. at 552.
20. Id. Mrs. Cipollone testified in her deposition that she smoked Chesterfields to imitate glamorous movie
stars in cigarette advertisements. Id. at 548. She also testified that she read magazines, listened to the radio, and
watched television, all during the years she smoked Chesterfields. Id. Mrs. Cipollone said that she remembered
all the advertising in magazines, billboards, and newspapers, as well as promotions about recessed and miracle
filter tips and "just what the doctor ordered" phrases in print. Id. at 551. She testified that she was led to believe,
by the advertising, that the cigarettes were safe and would not hurt her. Id. at 550.
21. Id. at 551.
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1985, upon which the case was tried. 22 The complaint included fourteen counts for
damages under several bases of recovery and relied on theories of strict liability,
negligence, express warranty, and intentional tort.23 The manufacturers moved for
summary judgment,24 contending that both the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 pro-
tected them from liability based on their post-1965 conduct.2" Thedistrict court,
in a pretrial ruling, held that the statutes established "a uniform warning which
would prevail throughout the country," and, thus, the "cigarette manufacturers
would not be subjected to varying requirements from state to state. 26 Initially, this
signaled a valid preemption defense for the manufacturers.27 The court, however,
allowed the common law actions to stand, despite the difficulty of proving that the
warnings were inadequate.28 The court believed the opportunity to be heard was
so important that it should not be preempted by the federal statutes.29 The court
ultimately granted a motion to strike the manufacturers' preemption defense."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted an interlocu-
tory appeal on the preemption question. 1 In reversing the lower court, the court of
appeals rejected the manufacturers' argument that state common law actions were
expressly preempted by the federal statutes, but accepted their argument that such
22. Id. at 552. However, evidence was introduced at trial showing Mrs. Cipollone was aware of the health
risks associated with smoking: she switched brands thinking newer ones were safer, she was told repeatedly by
her husband and family of the health dangers and possibility of cancer, she developed a bad cough, and she began
to make novenas to Saint Jude asking his help in preventing cancer. Id. at 551.
23. Id. Summarized, the alleged liability consisted of:
1. Failure to warn claim - Strict tort liability (and negligence) since the manufacturers failed to warn ade-
quately (or negligently failed to warn adequately) of the health effects of smoking.
2. Design defect claim -Strict tort liability since the manufacturers marketed defectively-designed ciga-
rettes instead of alternatively-designed, safer cigarettes.
3. Risk-utility claim - Strict tort liability since the health risks of the cigarettes exceeded their social util-
ity.
4. Express warranty claim Breach of an express warranty concerning the health effects of smoking.
5. Fraudulent misrepresentation claim -Fraud and misrepresentation in advertising of cigarettes from
1940 to 1983.




25. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2614 (1992). The 1965 statute required health warn-
ings to be placed on cigarette packages and was enacted due, in part, to the Surgeon General's report on the haz-
ards of smoking cigarettes. Id. at 2616 (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). The 1969 statute amended and
strengthened the prior Act, particularly by its banning of cigarette advertising in any Federal Communications
Commission electronic communication media. Id. at 2616-17 (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1335).
26. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.




30. Id. at 1171.
31. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
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state actions conflicted with federal law.32 The court determined that Congress's
intent of balancing the purposes of warning of the hazards of smoking and protect-
ing national economic interests would be upset by state common law actions for
damages based on noncompliance with warnings, advertisements, and promo-
tions other than those allowed in the federal statutes.33 The court did not specify
the claims that were preempted.34 The Supreme Court then denied a petition for
certiorari," and the Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine which claims were preempted and which claims were suitable for trial.36
The district court held that the claims of failure to warn, express warranty,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud were preempted by the
1965 and 1969 federal statutes to the extent that the claims relied on the manufac-
turers' advertising, promotional, and public relations efforts after January 1,
1966, which was the effective date of the 1965 Act.37 The court also held that the
plaintiffs design defect and risk-utility claims were not preempted by federal law
but were barred on other grounds.38 The district court limitedjury deliberations to
the fraudulent misrepresentation claim against each defendant, the conspiracy to
defraud claim against each defendant, the failure to warn claim against Liggett,
and the express warranty claim against Liggett.39 After a four-month trial, the jury
deliberated four and one-half days before reaching a verdict by answering special
interrogatories.' The jury rejected the fraudulent misrepresentation and conspir-
acy to defraud claims against all the defendants, but found that Liggett had
breached its duty to warn and its express warranties prior to 1966.41 No damages
were awarded on the failure to warn claim because Mrs. Cipollone had "voluntar-
ily and unreasonably encountered a known danger by smoking cigarettes."42 The
jury found that Mrs. Cipollone was eighty percent responsible for her own
32. Id. at 187. The court held that the 1965 Act preempted state law damage actions related to smoking and
health that challenged the adequacy of the package's warning or the propriety of actions concerning the advertis-
ing of cigarettes. Id. The court also held that where state law damage claims' success depended on the assertion
that a party had the duty to provide a warning to the public, in addition to the congressionally-mandated package
warning, such claims were preempted since they conflicted with the Act. Id.
33. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2614-15 (1992) (citing Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187).
34. Id. at 2615.
35. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
36. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 188.
37. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F Supp. 664, 669, 673-75 (D.N.J. 1986) (citing Cigarette Act,
supra note 3), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
38. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541,553 (3d Cir. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2608 (1992). The district court denied the risk-utility claim since it was barred by the New Jersey Products Lia-
bility Act. Id. (citing New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-1 to -7 (West 1987)). See
also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493-95 (D.N.J. 1988). The district court barred the
design defect claim on the ground that the plaintiff failed to present enough evidence that the defendants' failure to
market an alternatively-designed cigarette when it was feasible to do so in the mid- 1970s was a proximate cause
of Mrs. Cipollone's death. Cipollone, 893 F2d at 553. This ruling was not challenged on appeal. Id.
39. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 553.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 554.
42. Id.
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injuries." a Also, no damages were awarded to Mrs. Cipollone's estate on the
breach of warranty claim." The jury, however, awarded Mr. Cipollone $400,000
as compensation for damages he suffered from Liggett's breach of express war-
ranty.4"
In June of 1988, Mr. Cipollone moved for a new trial on the issue of Mrs. Ci-
pollone's damages and for an amended judgment that included prejudgment inter-
est.46 Mr. Cipollone contended that his wife's damages were substantial and that
the district court's jury instructions unfairly allowed the jury to consider her post-
1965 smoking in setting her comparative fault percentage.47 Two days later, Lig-
gett moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict' or a new trial on the
grounds of alleged error in the district court's jury instructions on express war-
ranty and in its interrogatories." The district court denied all motions."o Both par-
ties appealed.51 A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. 2 The
court of appeals held, in specifically affirming the district court's preemption
43. Id. New Jersey comparative fault law barred recovery if the plaintiff was more than 50% at fault. Id.




48. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is defined as a judgment entered by order of court for one party
although there has been a verdict for the other party. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (6th ed. 1990).
49. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 555 (3d Cir. 1990), affd inpart, rev'd inpart, 112 S. Ct.
2608 (1992).
50. Cipollone v. LiggettGroup, Inc., 693 R Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), affdinpart, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541
(3d Cir. 1990), affd in part, rev'd inpart, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
51. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 555. Liggett contended that the district court made the following errors in its jury
instructions: (1) the jury should have been instructed that Mrs. Cipollone's nonreliance on the advertisements
would preclude recovery under express warranty, (2) the jury should have been instructed that a buyer's actual
knowledge of a warranty breach bars recovery on an express warranty claim under assumption of risk or contrib-
utory fault, and (3) the jury was erroneously instructed on the failure to warn claim, particularly since the jury
was not instructed on a but-for causation requirement. Id.
Liggett also contended that the court erred in failing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on express
warranty since (1) the jury found Mrs. Cipollone voluntarily encountered a known danger by smoking, and thus
established a lack of proximate cause, (2) the plaintiff did not prove Mrs. Cipollone's cancer was proximately
caused by breach of express warranty, and (3) the evidence did not support a finding that any Liggett advertise-
ment warranted health effects in the future from smoking for forty years. Finally, Liggett contended error in
granting plaintiff partial summary judgment on the defendant's affirmative defenses under the statute of limita-
tions. Id.
In his appeal, Mr. Cipollone contended (1) the jury charge and interrogatories on the failure to warn issue erro-
neously allowed the jury to consider Mrs. Cipollone's post- 1965 smoking to determine her comparative fault per-
centage, (2) the district court erroneously struck the risk-utility claim by applying the New Jersey Products
Liability Act, (3) the district court erred by not awarding prejudgment interest, and (4) the district court erred by
preempting the intentional tort claims (fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to defraud). Mr. Cipollone
also said he would not press his other contentions if he won on the breach of express warranty and prejudgment
interest claims. Id.
Philip Morris's cross-appeal alleged that Mr. Cipollone's intentional tort claims were preempted and were
mooted by the jury verdict. Id. Lorillard contended that, considering Mr. Cipollone's agreement to be satisfied
with a breach of express warranty verdict and prejudgment interest, the appeals court's assumption ofjurisdiction
over the appeal relative to the claims against it (Lorillard) and Philip Morris violated the United States Constitu-
tion Article III "case or controversy" requirement. Id. Lorillard also contended that the Federal Labeling Act pre-
empted the intentional tort claims. Id. at 555-56 (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
52. Cipollone, 893 RE2d at 583.
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rulings, that Mr. Cipollone's state law claims were preempted by the 1965 and
1969 federal statutes." The case was remanded for a new trial to determine the
issues that were unresolved and those that were reversed.54 Chief Judge Gibbons
filed a concurring opinion and, by doing so, asserted the importance of the pre-
emption issue on the efficient resolution of the litigation.55 Since other federal
courts of appeal had agreed with the Third Circuit's opinion on the preemption
question,5 6 while the Supreme Courts of Minnesota and New Jersey had held that
the federal statutes did not preempt similar claims of damages from cigarette
smoking, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the federal
preemption conflict.5 7
Mr. Cipollone died after the court of appeals' decision; the Cipollones' son,
Thomas, as executor of both his mother's and father's estates, continued the litiga-
tion. 58 The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of ap-
peals' decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings." The Court held
that state law damage claims under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act of 1965 were actionable since the 1965 Act did not preempt these claims. 6°
The Court, however, disallowed two claims under the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969.61 The first claim preempted by the 1969 Act was the manu-
facturers' failure to warn.62 The second claim preempted was the manufacturers'
dilution of federally-mandated health warnings, but only when the manufacturers'
advertising omitted important information or included misleading facts or
53. Id. The claims were preempted by the 1965 and 1969 Acts to the extent that the claims relied on the manu-
facturers' advertising, promotional, and public relations activities after the 1965 Act's effective date. Id. at 559
(construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
54. Id. The court of appeals held that (1) the jury should not have been allowed to determine comparative fault
percentage based on Mrs. Cipollone's post-1965 behavior, considering federal preemption of claims against
manufacturers based on post-1965 marketing campaigns, (2) the district court erred on the express warranty
claim by not allowing the manufacturers to prove that Mrs. Cipollone did not believe the advertisements, (3) that
granting the defense motion for directed verdict on the claim that cigarettes' risk outweighed their social utility
was error, (4) if, at retrial, Mr. Cipollone prevailed on the breach of express warranty claim, he should also be
awarded prejudgment interest, (5) summary judgment for Mr. Cipollone may have been in error since there ex-
isted an issue of material fact as to whether the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (6) the inten-
tional tort claims were preempted. Id. at 559, 574, 578-79, 581-82.
55. Id. at 583. The Chief Judge stressed his opinion that the court of appeals' interlocutory ruling on preemp-
tion by the Federal Labeling Act, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987), was confusing to the litigation. Id. He said that:
Had the district court proceeded to trial before presenting us with an opportunity to confuse things by an
indeterminate and erroneous ruling on preemption, this case would today be far closer to resolution. In-
stead there will now be a new trial, and a new appeal, and the Supreme Court may still tell the parties that
our views on preemption are wrong, and they should try again.
Id.
56. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2613 (1992). The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits came to a similar conclusion. Id. at 2613 n.2.
57. Id. at 2613.
58. Id. at 2614.
59. Id. at 2625.
60. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
61. Id.
62. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
1994]
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opinions." Finally, the Court held that the 1969 Act did not preempt claims of ex-
press warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy, and thus
allowed these claims to be actionable if proven.'
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. A Historical Analysis of
Early Cigarette Litigation
As technological advances have exponentially multiplied over the past hundred
or so years, the concept of products liability emerged to hold manufacturers and
sellers financially accountable for the safety of their products.6" Initially, negli-
gence and express and implied breach of warranty theories of recovery dominated
products liability claims. 6 Eventually, due in part to limitations of warranty under
contract law's privity requirement, strict liability was developed as an alternative
method for holding manufacturers and sellers responsible for product-related inju-
ries.67 Cigarettes, a product manufactured from tobacco and intended for bodily
use, became included in the realm of products covered by strict liability con-
cepts. 68
Tobacco was first introduced to the civilized world around 1560 by the French
Ambassador to Portugal, Jean Nicot, who touted the new American herb as one
with healing powers.69 By the early 1600s, it was already suspected of being not
curative, but harmful. King James I of England wrote that tobacco was" 'a cus-
tome lothsome to the eye, hateful[l] to the [N]ose, harmful[l] to the [b]raine, dan-
gerous to the [L]ungs, and, in the black[e] stinking fume thereof, ne[e]rest
resembling the horrible St[i]gian [s]moke of the [pit that is bottom[e]less[e].' "70
In 1542, Pope Urban VII ordered the excommunication of persons using tobacco
on church property, by declaring that "[t]he use of . . .tobacco has gained so
strong a hold on persons of both sexes. . . that. . . during the actual celebration
of holy mass, they do not shrink from taking tobacco through the mouth or nos-
trils, thus soiling the alter linen and infecting the church with its noxious fumes
. . ," By the mid-i 800s, scientific studies began to show no positive health ef-
fects of tobacco and, by the early 1900s, research turned up evidence that there
might even be a correlation between smoking and illness.72 But, tobacco use
63. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
64. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
65. Peter F. Riley, The Product Liability of the Tobacco Industry: Has Cipollone v. Liggett Group Finally
Pierced the Cigarette Manufacturers'Aura of Invincibility?, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (1989).
66. Id. at 1110.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1111.
69. Jef I. Richards, Clearing the AirAbout Cigarettes: Will Advertisers'Rights Go Up in Smoke?, 19 PAC. L.J. 1,
4(1987).
70. Id. (quoting A Counterblaste to Tobacco (1604), quoted in Consumer Protection Gains and Setbacks, EDI-
TORIAL RES. REP. 70 (1978) and reprinted in A ROYAL RHETORICIAN (Robert S. Rait ed. 1900)).
71. Emmanuel Nneji, Products Liability: Breaking Through the Cocoon of the Cigarette Industry, 9 IN PuB.
INTEREST 43 (1989).
72. Richards, supra note 69, at 5.
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continued to be a popular habit for millions of people in the United States and
around the world despite all the negativism of the distant past. As a result, tobacco
played a significant role in early American economic development. 7
By 1950, nearly one of every two Americans smoked regularly. 74 At that time,
there was not a risk-sensitivity to products liability litigation. 71 In fact, the ciga-
rette was surrounded by some mystique that was enhanced through advertising in
magazines and on radio and television by movie stars and celebrities .7' Even
though cigarettes had been regarded as somewhat unhealthy, the only product in-
jury lawsuits of the day involved the occasional exploding soda bottle, food con-
77taminated with foreign objects, and similar unusual situations.
Within the next three years, The Journal of the American Medical Association
and other publications of scientific findings began linking smoking and lung can-
cer.78 The Reader's Digest helped to enlighten and inform the public by summariz-
ing these findings in simple terms that most everyone could understand.79 In 1953
and 1954, cigarette consumption fell two years in a row for the first time ever.8"
Simultaneously consumers launched the first assault of cigarette litigation against
the manufacturers.81 Approximately 100 to 150 suits were filed in 1953 and 1954
but were eventually dropped.82 This was due mainly to contingency fee-based
plaintiffs' attorneys fighting and losing quickly to cigarette companies that vowed
to spare no cost and that maintained a no-settlement philosophy in defending their
industryY The tobacco companies, well aware that the financial stakes were high,
pooled their considerable resources to create almost insurmountable legal barriers
against plaintiffs.' The manufacturers' success in obtaining summary judgment
was the usual result of their strategy in making certain a cigarette plaintiff never
got to a jury." Of the early cases, only ten made it far enough to be of any conse-
quence to future efforts by plaintiffs to win their cases: four were voluntarily
73. Douglas N. Jacobson, After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: How Wide Will the Floodgates of Cigarette
Litigation Open?, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 1021, 1025 (1989). The government today derives huge benefits from the
industry, and likewise actively supports the industry in its efforts toward producing nearly 20% of the world's
tobacco. Id. at 1026. In addition, some of the largest companies in the United States have been (and are currently)
involved in the cigarette industry. Id. RJR Nabisco, the parent company of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., is the
United States' 19th largest industrial company. Id. at 1026 n.34. Philip Morris, Cos., Inc., the nation's largest
tobacco company, owns Kraft, Inc., a food company, making Philip Morris the ninth largest publicly-traded
company in the United States. Id.
74. Robert L. Rabin,A Sociolegal History ofthe Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv. 853, 855 (1992).
75. Id.
76. Id.






83. Id. at 858.
84. Id. at 859.
85. Id.
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discontinued,86 three resulted in jury verdicts for the manufacturers,87 and three
were ended by summary judgment granted to the manufacturers .88
Plaintiffs in these early cases based their claims on negligence and breach of ex-
press and implied warranties.89 The early cases did result in some favorable deci-
sions for plaintiffs.9" But in the final analysis, the tobacco companies held a perfect
record against all legal challenges, due in part to limited medical knowledge, as
well as juries' hostility toward plaintiffs who blamed others for the consequences
of their own decisions to smoke. Of course, the tobacco manufacturers' over-
whelming financial and legal resources and willingness to stonewall smokers' law-
suits played a major role in their success."
B. Current Cigarette Litigation
By the mid-1960s, Americans had become acutely concerned with health, par-
ticularly regarding dangers from toxic substances2 An important result of this
concern was legislation directed at regulating environmental and consumer prod-
uct quality and safety." Particularly notable was the volume of studies on the haz-
ards of smoking, which ultimately led the Surgeon General to publish a report in
1964 that stated: " 'Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance
in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.' "" The Federal Trade
Commission [hereinafter FTC] followed with a new trade regulation rule that es-
tablished a cigarette advertisement to be in violation of the FTC Act if the ad were
" 'to fail to disclose, clearly and prominently, in all advertising and on every pack,
box, carton, or container [of cigarettes] that cigarette smoking is dangerous to
86. Donald W. Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REv.
1423, 1425-27 (1980) (discussing Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 E2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961);
Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961); Fine v. Philip Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960)).
87. See Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding that the manufacturer could not be
liable and could not have foreseen its products' dangers since the plaintiff began smoking in the 1930s and before
smoking's risks were recorded); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.) (holding that no
claim for negligence or breach of implied warranty could succeed since manufacturers could not have known that
their products caused cancer), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 805 (1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F2d 70
(5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the manufacturer could not be absolutely liable for the plaintiffs death), question
certified on reh'g, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), rev'd, 325 F2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
88. Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (holding that the plain-
tiff did not prove the foreseeability of the dangers of smoking); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d
170 (1st Cir. 1956) (summary judgment granted for the manufacturer after remand in Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d464 (lst Cir. 1958)); Albrightv. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa.
1972) (summary judgment granted for the manufacturer), affd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 951 (1974).
89. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1031.
90. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1033-34.
91. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1035-36 (citing Paul G. Crist & John M. Majoras, The Wew"Wave in Smok-
ing and Health Litigation -Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REv. 551, 552 n. 108 (1987)).
92. Id.
93. Rabin, supra note 74, at 864.
94. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2616 (1992) (quoting U.S. SuRGEON GENERAL'S AD-
VisORY COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH 33 (1964)). When the ad-
visory committee convened, in 1962, to discuss the issue, there were already over 7000 publications that
examined the link between smoking and health. Id.
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health and may cause death from cancer and other diseases.' "" In 1965, Congress
passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which required a
warning on cigarette packages but did not require a warning requirement in ciga-
rette advertising."6
The Act's purposes were to adequately inform the public that cigarette smoking
could be hazardous to one's health and to protect the economy from the imposition
of nonuniform and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations ." Ac-
cording to section 4 of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, it was
now unlawful to sell or distribute any cigarettes in the United States unless the
package contained a prominent label that stated: " 'CAUTION: CIGARETTE SMOKING
MAY BE HAZARDOUS To YOUR HEALTH.' "" Section 5 contained a preemption pro-
vision mandating that no statement relating to smoking and health was required on
any cigarette package, except for the section 4 requirement, and no statement re-
lating to smoking and health was required in cigarette advertising if the packages
were labeled properly. 9 In 1969, Congress amended the 1965 Act by enacting the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which strengthened the warning label by re-
quiring it to read that smoking" 'is dangerous' "100 rather than" 'may be hazard-
ous.' "101 The 1969 Act also banned cigarette advertising in " 'any medium of
electronic communication subject to [FCC] jurisdiction.' "102 Finally, the 1969
Act modified section 5's preemption by stating that, concerning advertising or
promotion of properly-labeled cigarette packages, no requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health could be imposed under state law.1"3
95. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.61-67 (1964)). The FTC postponed the regulation's
enforcement for six months, due to a request by Congress. Id.
96. Id. (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). The Act thus adopted half of the FTC's proposed regulations. Id.
(citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
97. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2616.
98. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1333 (Supp. III 1965-67)).
99. Id. (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3, §§ 1334-1335).
100. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1333 (1970)).
101. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1333 (Supp. III 1965-67)).
102. Id. at 2617 (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1335 (1970)).
103. Id. Congress passed this law in 1969 in the midst of three important contemporary proceedings: (1) The
FTC announced the reinstatement of its 1964 warning requirements for advertising that Congress did not adopt;
(2) the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was considering banning the broadcast of cigarette adver-
tisements by radio and television; and (3) states were proposing to regulate cigarette advertising. Id. at 2616. In
1972, the Federal Trade Commission extended its warning label requirement to printed cigarette advertisements,
based on the narrower preemption provision prohibiting only state-imposed restrictions. Id. at 2617. In 1984,
Congress again amended the warning label requirement so that manufacturers were to rotate four different warn-
ing labels on cigarette packages:
(1) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphy-
sema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.
(2) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks
to Your Health.
(3) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal In-
jury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
(4) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 657 n.2 (Minn. 1989) (citing Cigarette Act, supra note
3, § 1333(a)(1) (Supp. 1984)).
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. Another important key to societal attitudes toward consumer safety during this
period was the change in products liability law, particularly the emergence of strict
liability. 104 Strict liability relieved the plaintiff from proving a manufacturer's fore-
seeability of danger or injury to consumers, negligence, and breach of warranty.05
In addition to eliminating concerns of privity, strict liability only required proof
that the latter sold its product in a defective or dangerous condition.105 This ap-
proach was legitimated upon adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts by the American Law Institute in 1965.107
It was in this setting, and against the backdrop of newly-emerging toxic tort liti-
gation,10 8 that the current wave of cigarette challenges began. 9 In Roysdon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,11 the plaintiff alleged strict liability because the manufac-
turer failed to warn of the risk of vascular disease.111 The plaintiff also claimed
that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous."2 The district court
dismissed the failure to warn claim before trial and granted a directed verdict for
the manufacturer, holding that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case that
the product was unreasonably dangerous.113 The court applied a consumer expec-
tations test that defined a defective product as one that was dangerous beyond its
generally-known characteristics."' The court reasoned that because the dangers
of cigarettes were common knowledge to most of the public, cigarettes could
not be unreasonably dangerous. 5 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
104. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1036. This tort concept shifted the burden of proof from the injured consumer
to the maker of the defective product. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1037.
107. Id. This section reads:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the con-
dition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule. . . applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual rela-
tion with the seller.
Id. at 1037 n. 122 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402(A) (1965)).
108. Rabin, supra note 74, at 864. Americans were growing more sensitive to toxic risk, as evidenced by toxic
harm cases involving such products as asbestos, Agent Orange, and Dalkon Shields. Rabin, supra note 74, at 864.
Plaintiffs were alleging that their diseases were caused by post exposure to toxic substances. Rabin, supra note
74, at 864.
109. Rabin, supra note 74, at 865.
110. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), affd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
111. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir. 1988). Mr. Roysdon's leg was ampu-
tated due to severe peripheral atherosclerotic vascular disease, alleged to be caused by smoking. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 235.
114. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191-92 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), affd, 849 F.2d
230 (6th Cir. 1988).
115. Id.
[Vol. 14:657
CIGARETTE LITIGA TION AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
reasonable consumers could not say cigarettes were defective, due to the commu-
nity's common knowledge; therefore, the issue of unreasonable danger should not
be submitted to the jury.116
In Horton v. American Tobacco Co. 117 the plaintiff alleged liability of the manu-
facturer for the decedent's lung cancer."'8 The complaint stated that the manufac-
turer had knowingly contaminated the tobacco with insect control pesticide, and it
thus was unreasonably dangerous.119 The trial court held that strict liability con-
cepts of section 402A did not apply since the cigarettes were not unreasonably
dangerous. 120 After a mistrial on the liability issue, the Mississippi Supreme Court
was asked to determine whether cigarettes were subject to strict liability claims; it
refused to review until after a second trial.121
Many jurisdictions eventually adopted a risk-utility analysis to determine a
402A standard of liability. 122 This test balanced risks against benefits to determine
if a product was defective or unreasonably dangerous. 123 The risk-utility analysis
quickly emerged as a possible approach for plaintiffs to follow in establishing a
prima facie case of liability.124 In Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,125 the
first case to be tried under a risk-utility concept, the plaintiffs claimed that smok-
ing the manufacturer's cigarettes caused the decedent's death.126 The court, how-
ever, held that a risk-utility instruction to the jury was not possible as a matter of
law.'27 Similarly, in Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 12 the plaintiff alleged that
the manufacturer was liable for his lung cancer and that, under the risk-utility con-
cept, recovery under strict liability should have been possible without a claim of a
defective product since the risks of health concerns outweighed the usefulness of
cigarettes. 129 However, the district court ruled, as a matter of law, that the risk-
utility test was not recognized under state law.130 It also held that the state's version
116. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988).
117. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1038 n. 131 (citing Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 16 Prod. Safety & Liab.
Rep. (BNA) 227 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 1988)).
118. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1038 n. 131.
119. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1038 n. 133.
120. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1037. Other states using section 402A have also determined that cigarettes
cannot be termed unreasonably dangerous. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1039 (citing Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), affd, 849 F2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988)).
121. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1039 n. 137 (citing Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 16 Prod. & Safety Liab.
Rep. (BNA) at964 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 1988)).
122. Rabin, supra note 74, at 866.
123. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1039.
124. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1039. If utility outweighs risk, the trier of fact says whether the risk has been
sufficiently reduced by the manufacturer. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1039. The manufacturer is judged on all
relevant facts as to whether it reasonably placed the product on the market. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1040.
125. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1040 n. 145.
126. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1040 n. 145.
127. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1040 n. 145. The jury held (9 to 3) in favor of the manufacturer since the evi-
dence presented did not link the cause of death to smoking. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1040 n. 148.
128. 685 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.H. 1988).
129. Id. at 855.
130. Id. at 859.
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of section 402A required proof that the product was defective. '31 Finally, in Miller
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ,132 the district court held that, since risks of
smoking had a long history of public knowledge, proof that the cigarettes were de-
fective was not possible. 33 The court stated that a risk-utility analysis could not be
used under state law since there existed no issues of fact showing a defect.' 34 The
court of appeals adopted this reasoning by affirming the rationale and the deci-
sion.1
35
1. The Statutory Preemption Issue
The issue of federal statutory preemption of state law ultimately became a con-
stitutional issue with regard to claims of manufacturers' failure to warn consumers
about the health risks of smoking. 13 The preemption question was prompted by
various interpretations of the 1965 and 1969 Acts. 13' The preemption defense,
based upon the Article VI Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
argued that federal law preempted state law when a conflict arose. ,
38
Contemporaneous with the current wave of cigarette litigation, the United
States Supreme Court, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co. ,3' held that state law could be
preempted by express language of a federal statute. 4 ' The Court asserted that con-
gressional intent could be" 'explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.' ""' Following the Jones decision, the
Court again was faced with determining whether Congress could preempt state
law in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta.'42 In De La Cuesta,
the Court held that state law could be preempted, absent express language, if the
federal law completely occupied a legislative field so that "Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it.' "'" Finally, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,'" the Court main-
tained that state law could be preempted if that law conflicted with congressional
goals articulated in federal law."'
131.Id. at 858-59.
132. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1041 n. 154.
133. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1041 n. 154.
134. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1041 n. 154.
135. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1041 n. 154.
136. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1045.
137. Jacobson, supra note 73, at 1045.
138. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
139. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
140. Id. at 525.
141. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
142. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
143. Id. at 153 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230, revd, Rice v. Board of Trade, 331
U.S. 247 (1947)).
144. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
145. Id. at 212-13.
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2. Cigarette Litigation in Which Claims Were Preempted
The strength of the preemption defense was first manifested in cigarette litiga-
tion in Stephen v. American Brands, Inc. 4 In Stephen, the deceased had smoked
for fifty-four years.147 The complaint alleged that the manufacturer failed to ade-
quately warn the decedent of the risks of smoking. 148 The manufacturer alleged
full compliance with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,149 and
relied on the preemption defense. ' The district court denied plaintiffs motion to
strike the preemption defense by holding that "the labeling act 'does preempt tort
claims which are premised on the adequacy of warnings on cigarette packaging or
the propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and promotion
of cigarettes.' "151 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and, relying in part on the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, held that Congress could
preempt state law expressly or impliedly. 152 The court stated that "[tihe burden of
showing that Congress intended to preclude the states from providing traditional
state law remedies for its citizens rests upon the defendant."153 Finally, the court
stated that further district court proceedings would determine how the preemption
defense would affect the plaintiffs claims."'
That same year, the First Circuit faced the preemption issue in Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc. "' Here, the decedent smoked three to four packs of cigarettes per day
until he died from lung cancer at age forty-nine. 5 6 Again, the plaintiffs in Palmer
alleged liability due to negligent failure to adequately warn of the dangers of smok-
ing, among other causes of action. 5 7 The manufacturer asserted a preemption de-
fense and filed a motion to dismiss.158 The motion was denied by the district court,
which concluded that Congress's silence on the preemption issue did not indicate a
desire to eliminate recovery by consumers injured by cigarette ads that failed to
warn of the hazards of smoking. "9 The First Circuit, in reversing the lower court,
146. 825 F.2d 312 (11 th Cir. 1987).
147. Id. at 313.
148. Id.
149. Cigarette Act, supra note 3, §§ 1331-1341.
150. Stephen, 825 F.2d at 313.
151. Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987)) (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
152. Id. (citingJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); Fidelity Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, rev'd, Rice
v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947)). Additionally, the court held that state law could be preempted if it
conflicted with federal law. Id.
153. Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, rehg denied, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984), and cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1104 (1986)).
154. Id.
155. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
156. Id. at 622.
157. Id. The complaint also alleged common law negligence, breach of warranty, and Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act violations. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F Supp. 1171, 1173 (D. Mass. 1986), rev d, 825 F.2d 620
(lst Cir. 1987)).
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turned to statutory construction and interpretation of the Federal Act. 6 ' It held
that a suit against cigarette manufacturers for damages based on a common law
inadequate warning concept, particularly if the warning satisfied the Act's man-
date, disrupted congressional intent to balance health protection and trade regula-
tion under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 16"' The preemption
holding stemmed from the court's determination that the Act's language was clear
and unambiguous. 162 There was no reason to determine intent by analyzing legis-
lative history, since Congress included a statement of purpose and a preemption
section in the Act itself.'6 The First Circuit extended its analysis beyond the
Stephen Court's evaluation by stating that it believed Congress was attempting to
balance two competing interests: health protection education by informing the
public of health hazards of smoking, and trade protection by prohibiting " 'di-
verse, nonuniform and confusing cigarette labeling.' "164 Therefore, it felt that the
Act" 'represents a carefully drawn balance between the purposes of warning the
public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the interests of the na-
tional economy.' ",'
The preemption defense was again utilized in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. 66 In Roysdon, the plaintiff had his left leg amputated below the knee due to
peripheral atherosclerotic vascular disease.6 7 He sued the cigarette manufacturer
for failure to warn of the risk of vascular disease and for placing defective and un-
reasonably dangerous products on the market. 66 The district court ruled for the
manufacturer by dismissing the failure to warn claim before trial and by granting a
directed verdict on the unreasonably dangerous claim since the plaintiffs had not
established a jury question as to that issue.'69 The Sixth Circuit affirmed by hold-
ing that the state claim for failure to adequately warn was preempted by the Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 7 ' The court stated that cigarettes
were not defective or unreasonably dangerous, since" '[k]nowledge that cigarette
smoking is harmful to health is widespread and can be considered part of the com-
mon knowledge of the community.' ""' The court again based its decision con-
cerning the inadequate warning claim on preemption analysis.' 72 It used
interpretation of congressional intent, federal statutory language, and federal law
160. Id. at 623.
161. Id. at 626 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
162. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
163. Id. (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3, §§ 1331, 1334).
164. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1331 (1970)).
165. Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1043 (1987)).
166. 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
167. Id. at 232.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
171. Id. at 235-36 (quoting Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F Supp. 1189, 1192 (ED. Tenn.
1985), affd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988)).
172. Id. at 233-35.
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supremacy to arrive at its conclusion.173 Accordingly, the court determined that
the Act was a carefully drafted balance of interests between a need to protect the
public and a need to protect the economy and, as such, was not intended to be su-
perseded by any State.174
.Finally, in Pennington v. Vistron Corp. ,175 the decedent's wife sued approxi-
mately twenty-five companies, including cigarette makers, for her husband's
death due to cancer of the esophagus. 7 The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the cigarette manufacturers,177 and the ruling was affirmed on appeal. 178
The Fifth Circuit, like other appellate courts, proceeded on a preemption analysis
path.179 First, the court disagreed with the district court's holding that all post-
1965 state tort claims based on smoking injury were preempted. 180 The court held
that the federal statute did not preempt the plaintiffs unreasonably dangerous per
se claim under Louisiana law.181 Second, the court agreed with the district court
that the plaintiffs pre-1966 failure to adequately warn claim was not pre-
empted. 182 The court, however, did affirm the lower court's granting of summary
judgment for the manufacturers on both non-preempted claims.183 The ruling was
based on the plaintiffs failure to present sufficient evidence to establish a genuine
issue of material fact for trial on the non-preempted claims."U Once again, the
plaintiffs extended cigarette litigation produced no recovery due to the constitu-
tional doctrine of preemption.
3. Cigarette Litigation in Which Claims Were Not Preempted
Some state supreme courts have determined that the federal statutes did not pre-
empt state common law claims. 181 In Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,188 the
173. Id.
174. Id. at 234-35 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (lst Cir. 1987)).
175. 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989). R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Inc. and American Tobacco Company
were the tobacco company defendants-appellees in the suit. Id.
176. Id. at 416.
177. Id. at 416-17.
178. Id. at 427.
179. Id. at 420-21. The court relied on Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (lst Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312
(11 th Cir. 1987); and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987); in determining that the failure to provide an adequate warning claim under Louisiana law conflicted with
Congress's clear intent to require uniform warning labels nationwide, and was therefore preempted. Pennington
v. Vistron Corp., 876 E2d 414, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1989). This included all the plaintiffs post- 1965 failure to warn
claims. Id.
180. Pennington, 876 F.2d at 423.
181. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
182. Id. at 424.
183. I.
184. Id. at 425-27. The court granted summary judgment since the plaintiff did not submit evidence in opposi-
tion to the manufacturers' motion for summary judgment. Id. The court stated that "Mrs. Pennington failed to
make a showing sufficient to create a substantial fact issue as to an essential element of her claim -that the dece-
dent's esophageal cancer was caused by a defect in the tobacco companies' cigarettes." Id. at 427.
185. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2613 (1992).
186. 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
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plaintiff alleged the decedent's death was caused by lung cancer from smoking
Camel cigarettes for thirty years. 18 7 The trial court granted summary judgment to
the manufacturer and retailer on the basis of preemption by federal statute, but the
court of appeals reversed, holding there was no federal preemption.188 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that state tort claims under a state-imposed duty to
warn of hazards are impliedly preempted by federal statute. 189 The court said that
preempted claims were those that attack the adequacy of advertising concerning
health and smoking; those based on strict liability for failure to warn of adverse
health consequences; those state breach of warranty claims based on duty to warn;
and those based on negligence of duty to warn about possible hazards.19 The court
said that state law claims not preempted were those based on "defective condi-
tion"; those under strict liability for unsafe design; those of intentional misrepre-
sentation based on false advertising statements; and those based on failure to warn
that were also pre-1966 claims. 9'
Likewise, in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,192 the plaintiff alleged her
husband's lung cancer death was due to thirty-eight years of smoking .,93 The com-
plaint alleged theories of design defect, inadequate warning, fraud, and advertis-
ing misrepresentation.194 On Federal Cigarette Act preemption grounds, the trial
court granted partial summary judgment for the manufacturer on the failure to
warn, fraud, and advertising misrepresentation claims, and allowed the remaining
claims to stand. 9 The superior court, appellate division, affirmed subject to
modification. 96 Pursuant to appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court had the task
of determining whether the Federal Cigarette Act preempted the plaintiffs com-
mon law tort claims,' 97 and" 'whether Congress intended that the federal regula-
tion supersede state law.' "198 Based in part on the Forster decision, the court
determined that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did not pre-
empt state common law claims for design defect, failure to warn, fraud, or misrep-
resentation in advertising, thereby rejecting five federal circuit courts of appeals'
187. Id. at 656. The complaint alleged that Reynolds' persuasive advertising led to the belief that it was non-
hazardous to health and, eventually, to addiction. Id. at 656-57.
188. Id. at 657 (citing Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Minn. 1988), aff'din
part, rev'd in part, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989)).
189. Id. at 660.
190. Id. at 660-62.
191. Id. at 661-63.
192. 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
193. Id. at 1241.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The modification concerned the trial court's decision on the design defect claim-the Appellate Divi-
sion believed Comment i of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, should be applied under New Jersey's
Products Liability Law. Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1241.
197. Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1242.
198. Id. at 1243 (alteration in original) (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369
(1986)).
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decisions on preemption. 9 The court stated that it was "convinced that had
Congress intended to immunize cigarette manufacturers from packaging, labeling,
misrepresentation, and warning claims, it knew how to do so with unmistakable
specificity. 2 0
Thus, the diametrically opposed views regarding federal statute preemption of
damage claims set the stage for the United States Supreme Court to consider the
issue and for the Court to define the boundaries for future litigation arising from
cigarette smoking injuries.
IV. INSTANT CASE
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,201 the Supreme Court became the ultimate
arbiter on the issue of the preemptive effect of the federal cigarette labeling and
advertising statutes upon damage claims against cigarette manufacturers.20 2
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court concerning Parts I through IV,
and was joined in Parts V and VI by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and O'Connor.2"3 Justice Blackmun, along with Justices Kennedy and Souter, con-
curred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part, while Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas concurred with the judgment in part and dissented in
part. 204
Justice Stevens and the majority25 began the analysis in Parts I and II, with an
introduction of the procedural history of the lengthy Cipollone litigation and a brief
background of the 1965 and 1969 federal statutes enacted to regulate cigarette la-
beling and advertising. 2 6 The Court determined, in Part Ill, that based on the
concept of constitutional supremacy, the court of appeals' approach was slightly
misdirected on interpreting Congress's intentions of preemption .2 7 The Court be-
lieved the express language of section 5 of the 1965 and 1969 Acts determined the
preemptive scope, since Congress specifically provided for a section addressed to
that issue. 2 8 There was no need to imply " 'intent to preempt state laws from the
substantive provisions' of the legislation, 20 9 so there was no reason to look
beyond section 5 of each act to know what was expressly preempted.210
199. Id. at 1251 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals had specifically supported the preemption defense for failure to warn. Id. at 1246.
200. Id. at 1251 (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
201. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
202. Id. at 2615.
203. Id. at 2613.
204. Id.
205. Id. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter in Parts I, II, III, and IV. Id. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and O'Connor in Parts V and VI. Id.
206. Id. at 2613-17.
207. Id. at 2617-18.
208. Id. at 2618 (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334).
209. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282
(1987)).
210. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334).
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In Part IV, the Court focused on the 1965 Act's preemption provisions and de-
termined that the provisions only prohibited state and federal rulemaking agencies
from requiring specific warning statements on cigarette labels or in advertise-
ments.211 According to the Court, this interpretation was appropriate for three rea-
sons: a presumption existed against the preemption of state police power
regulations, since section 4 of the 1965 Act expressed verbatim the warning of
which Congress approved; the section 4 warning did not preclude additional re-
quirements of state law; and there was no conflict between federal preemption of
state warning requirements and state common law suits.212 The majority stated
that section 5 should be interpreted as superseding "only positive enactments by
legislatures or administrative agencies that mandate particular warning labels."" 3
Ultimately, the Court held that the 1965 Act only preempted state and federal re-
quirements of specific warning statements, and did not preempt state law damage
claims.2"4
In Part V, the Court determined the 1969 Act to contain much broader language
than the 1965 Act for two reasons: the 1969 Act prohibited state law" 'require-
ment[s] or prohibition[s],' "and not just statements; and the 1969 Act covered re-
sponsibility in cigarette " 'advertising or promotion,' " and not simply
"'advertising' " statements.215 The Court rejected both parties' contentions that
the 1969 Act did not change the federal law's preemptive scope, and held that the
Act did change the law considerably." 6 The majority disagreed with the Cipol-
lones' claim that the preemption section of the 1969 Act was not broad enough to
preempt common law actions.217 The Court expressed its opinion that the phrase
" '[n]o requirement or prohibition' "meant no distinction between positive enact-
ments and common law so that, although legislative history indicated Congress's
concern with the former, the plain language of the Act covered the latter as well.218
Additionally, the Court rejected another of the petitioner's attempts to exclude
common law rules and thereby limit the 1969 Act's preemption language to
211. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334).
212. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334).
213. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334) (citing Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1091-92
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)). The Court felt that this reading paralleled the 1965 Act's
purpose of avoiding confusing "regulations," and that the term "regulations" meant positive legislative enact-
ments, not state common law claims. Id. at 2619. The Federal Trade Commission's regulatory efforts were also
reflective of Congress's intent to prevent confusing label regulations and to preempt all authorities from requiring
any statement concerning advertising. Id.
214. Id. at 2619 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
215. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
216. Id. at 2619-20. The 1969 Act changed the warning label, banned broadcast media advertising, and al-
lowed print advertising to be limited. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
217. Id. at 2620 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
218. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)). The Court stated the differences between the
Acts in an alternate way: The common law does not require the use of a particular statement on packaging or in
advertising, and it is the duty of the common law to enforce either affirmative requirements or negative prohibi-
tions. Id. As such, the Court did not allow the limitation of the 1969 Act to positive enactments by legislative or
agency bodies. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
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positive enactments: The section 5(b) phrase" 'imposed under State law' "recog-
nizes common law as well as statutes and agency regulations.219
However, the 1969 Act's preemptive effect does not cover all common law
claims, according to the Court's view, nor does the Act say which are or are not
preempted .220 Accordingly, the Court resolved to look at each of the common law
claims to decide which were preempted. 221 To do this, the Court looked to see if
the legal duty behind a common law damage suit is a" 'requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health . . . imposed under State law with respect to...
advertising or promotion.' ",222 The Court concluded that each portion of the sec-
tion 5(b) clause would determine which common law claims were preempted, and
which were not.223
A. Failure to Warn
The Court held that preemption existed for claims that relied on a state law
"'requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to . . . advertising or
promotion.' ,224 Thus, failure to warn claims were preempted if they required a
showing that the manufacturers' post-1969 advertising should have included
more, or clearer, warnings.22 s On the other hand, the Court interpreted the Act to
allow failure to warn claims based on manufacturers' testing, research, or other
actions unrelated to advertising or promotion of cigarettes.226
B. Breach of Express Warranty
The petitioner alleged breach of an express warranty based on advertising state-
ments of the manufacturer. 227 The district court and the Third Circuit had previ-
ously determined that this claim was preempted after 1965.228 The Court
reasoned that this result was misguided due to the lower courts' concentration on
the claim's challenge of the "propriety" of advertising, rather than on the narrower
question of whether the claim required a state law regulation based on smoking
219. Id. at 2621 (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)). The Court believed the 1969 Act to be
much broader, and thus, the preemptive reach of§ 5(b) was extended accordingly. Id. (construing Cigarette Act,
supr note 3).
220. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
221. Id.
222. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)). The Court also resolved
to narrowly construe the language of§ 5(b). Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
223. Id. The Court assumed the claims to be analyzed were valid state law claims. Id. (applying Cigarette Act,
supra note 3).
224. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
225. Id. at 2621-22. Failure to warn liability could be established by a showing that a warning was needed to
make a product safe, suitable, and fit for intended use, that the manufacturer failed to warn, and that the failure
resulted proximately in consumer's injury. Id. Petitioner alleged two failure to warn theories: (1) manufacturers
were negligent in testing, researching, marketing, and advertising their products and (2) manufacturers failed to
adequately warn of the health consequences of smoking. Id.
226. Id. at 2622 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
227. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 574-76 (3d Cir. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1497 (D.N.J. 1988)).
228. Id.
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and health concerning advertising.229 According to the Court, an express warranty
claim is based on the warrantor's (manufacturer's) requirements, not state law re-
quirements.2 3' Thus, although the duty not to breach warranties arises under state
law, the specific requirement based on smoking and health concerning cigarette
advertising in a breach of express warranty claim is based on a manufacturer's ad-
vertising statements .231 As a result, the Court concluded that even if the warranty
terms were contained in the manufacturer's advertisements, the breach of war-
ranty claim, based on advertising, is itself not based on a state-imposed duty.232




The Court began its analysis of fraud by discussing the merits of the first of two
theories of fraudulent misrepresentation propounded by the petitioner. 234 First,
the Court examined the claim that the manufacturers' advertising "neutralized the
effect of federally mandated warning labels" by downplaying the dangers of smok-
ing. 23' The Court said that such a state law prohibition was the converse of a state
law requirement that warnings be included in advertising and, since the 1969 Act
preempts both, it precluded petitioner's first fraud claim.236 Considering prior
Federal Trade Commission and Food and Drug Administration regulations pro-
hibiting the negation of consumer warnings,237 the majority determined that the
first claim of fraudulent misrepresentation was collateral to the failure to warn
claim, which was also preempted by the 1969 Act.238
The second claim was one of intentional fraud and misrepresentation by false
representation and concealment of material fact. 239 The Court analyzed the 1969
Act's preemption power regarding its relation to the state law duty not to make
such false statements or to conceal facts .24 The Court found that preemption lan-
guage applied only to "the imposition of state law obligations 'with respect to the
229. Id. (emphasis omitted).
230. Id.
231. Id. The Court said, in sum, that § 5(b) should not be read such that a manufacturer's express warranty,
voluntarily undertaken, had the force of a state law requirement. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
232. Id. at 2622-23.




236. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
237. Id. The Court recognized that regulators have been aware of the connection between prohibitions on ad-
vertisements that associated smoking with" 'glamour, romance, youth, happiness,' "and requirements for warn-
ings in advertisements. Id. (quoting 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.61-.67 (1964)). In 1964, the Federal Trade Commission
required the cigarette manufacturer, in order to prevent false impressions, to disclose smoking's health risks if it
also advertised smoking's pleasures. Id. (citing 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.61-.67 (1964)). In 1965, the Food and Drug
Administration also ruled that hazardous substances would not meet federal labeling laws if anything tending to
negate or disclaim the warning appeared on the label. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 191.102 (1965)).
238. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
239. Id.
240. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
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advertising or promotion' of cigarettes," so that claims of concealment of material
facts were not preempted if based on a state law duty to disclose those facts by
means other than advertising.241
The Court held that claims of fraudulent misrepresentation from advertising,
such as those based on false statements of material fact made in advertisements,
are not preempted by the 1969 Act.242 It predicated this result upon the general
duty not to deceive, rather than a duty based on smoking and health. 21 Congres-
sional intent did not include protection of manufacturers from claims of fraud, ac-
cording to the Court. 24 The Court felt Congress intended a narrow reading of the
phrase " 'relating to smoking and health,' " so that deceptive advertising regula-
tions would not be circumvented.245 It believed the 1969 Federal Act's purpose in
using the phrase was narrow and specific in the first place, since normally state
law prohibitions on intentional fraud were based on the generally broad concept of
falsity. 246 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the phrase" 'based on smoking and
health' "did not include the broader duty not to make fraudulent statements, so the
claim based on these advertising statements was not preempted.247
D. Conspiracy to Misrepresent or Conceal Material Facts
The majority concluded that the 1969 Act did not preempt the petitioner's
claim of conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material facts of smoking's health
hazards. 2' As the claim was founded on a duty not to conspire to commit fraud,
the Court determined that this duty was not a prohibition" 'based on smoking and
health' "for the same reasons as its analysis of the intentional fraud claim.245
E. Summary of the Court's Opinion
Part VI of the Supreme Court majority's opinion, therefore, upheld the validity
of state law damage claims under the 1965 Act.2b0 Concerning the 1969 Act, it
preempted failure to warn claims and negation of federal warning requirements
claims if the claims relied on omissions or additions in advertising, but it allowed
241. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)). If state law required dis-
closure of material facts about smoking's health effects to an administrative agency, for example, the 1969 Act, §
5(b), would not preempt a claim for failure to disclose under state law. Id. (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
242. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
243. Id. at 2623-24. Analysis of congressional intent demonstrated the 1965 and 1969 Acts' power to punish
deceptive advertising practices. Id.
244. Id. at 2624.
245. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)). "The Senate Report emphasized that the 'pre-
emption of regulation or prohibition with respect to cigarette advertising is narrowly phrased topreempt only State
action based on smoking and health.' "Id. at 2624 n.26 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. No. 566, 91 st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663). Other state powers concerning taxation, sale,
and similar police powers would not be affected. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
248. Id. at 2624-25 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
249. Id. at 2624 (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
250. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
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to stand claims of breach of express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresenta-
tion, and conspiracy."'
E Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
In an opinion in which Justices Kennedy and Souter joined, Justice Blackmun
concurred with the majority as to Parts I through IV, but disagreed with Parts V
and VI.252 Justice Blackmun agreed with all of the majority's non-preemptive
opinion, but would have carried it further to include even the claims the majority
held to be preempted by the 1969 Act.253 In essence, Justice Blackmun would have
allowed all claims to stand; thus, none would be preempted by federal statute.25 4
He believed neither version of the federal statutes showed congressional intent to
preempt any state common law damage actions.255 He expressed his conviction
that the language of the 1969 Act did not exhibit any more of a congressional intent
to preempt state common law damage claims than did that of the 1965 Act.
256 Jus-
tice Blackmun's statutory interpretation differed from the majority's broadly-
encompassing view that the phrase " 'no requirement or prohibition' " included
preemption of state common law suits.217
Justice Blackmun's view concerning the legislative history of the 1969 Act indi-
cates his belief that Congress did not intend to leave consumers injured through
cigarette manufacturers' conduct without remedies.258 He postulated that
Congress would not have left consumers, injured as such, without a means ofjudi-
cial remedy.
259
Finally, Justice Blackmun could not distinguish, as readily as the majority had,
between the common law claims so that some were allowed and some were not.260
He felt the Court frequently shifted from a general analysis of preemption to one of
specificity. 26 1 Justice Blackmun viewed this inconsistency as confusing, since he
believed that Congress never "intended to create such a hodge-podge of allowed
and disallowed claims when it amended the pre-emption provision in 1970. "262 He
251. Id. at 2625 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 2625-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2625 (see Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
256. Id. at 2627 (see Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
257. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)). Justice Blackmun dis-
agreed with the majority's broad interpretation since he believed that, due to the Court's past distinctions be-
tween direct state regulation and indirect regulation through common law damage actions, damage claims were
not" 'requirements' "or" 'prohibitions' "under state law. Id. at 2629 (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette
Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
258. Id. at 2630. Justice Blackmun stated that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act had no alter-
native remedies, unlike other statutes that did. Id. (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). He cited § 502(a) of
ERISA as an example of how Congress had established a broad civil enforcement scheme to protect the con-
sumer. Id. (citing Employment Retirement Income Security Act 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a), (c)(1) (1988 & Supp. III
1991)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 2631.
261. Id.
262. Id. (see Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
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believed the majority's decision would create lower court confusion in implemen-
tation and, more importantly, that the States would be less able to protect their citi-
zens' safety and health.263
Justice Scalia wrote an opinion, with which Justice Thomas joined, that con-
curred in part and dissented in part with the plurality.21 4 In contrast to Justice
Blackmun's view, Justice Scalia believed that all of the petitioner's claims should
be preempted, not under a narrow or broad interpretation of congressional pre-
emptive intent, but under an interpretation according to a statute's "apparent
meaning. ""' He felt there was no basis for the plurality's narrow statutory con-
struction.266 Justice Scalia favored instead the concept that legislative purpose is
accurately conveyed by the ordinary meaning of a statute's language,267 so that
when it suggested an intent for the provision to be read broadly (or narrowly), the
Court's interpretation of a preemption provision should also be broad (or nar-
row). 
268
Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality's finding of partial preemption on
three points. 269 First, he expressed his view that the petitioner's pre-1969 failure
to warn claim should be preempted. 27" The Court had stated that since common
law duties did not require particular statements in their advertisements, but only
some warning statement concerning health risks, the 1965 Act did not preempt
claims based on those duties.271 Justice Scalia did not agree with the particularity
expressed by the majority. 272 Second, he believed the post-1969 breach of express
warranty claim was preempted by the 1969 Act. 273 He disagreed with the majori-
ty's finding that liability for breach of express warranty is not imposed by state law
within the 1969 Act's language but is assumed by the manufacturer.274 Justice Sca-
lia contended that if liability arises with a promise or advertising representation, it
does so by law and, as such, the express warranty claim was preempted. 275 Third,
he argued the post-1969 fraud and misrepresentation claims should be
preempted.276 Justice Scalia stated he would use a " 'proximate application'
263. Id.
264. Id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
265. Id. Justice Scalia believed the best procedure was to apply to the statutory text "ordinary principles of stat-
utory construction." Id.
266. Id. at 2633.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 2634. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,7-8 (1987).
269. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2634 (1992).
270. Id. at 2635 (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
271. Id. at 2634 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
272. Id. Justice Scalia also would preempt claims based on manufacturers' failure to include in their advertise-
ments statements related to health and smoking and claims based on failure to make statements related to health
and smoking through non-advertising media. Id. at 2635.
273. Id. at 2636 (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
274. Id. at 2635 (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
275. Id. at 2635-36.
276. Id. at 2637.
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methodology" to decide if the claims required duties " 'based on smoking and
health.' "277 He agreed with Justice Blackmun, albeit for completely different rea-
sons, in the latter's opinion that the Court's decision would create more implemen-
tation problems and questions than it would resolve.278
V. ANALYSIS
Cipollone is the first tort litigation decision based on injury from cigarette
smoking that actually resulted in a monetary decision for the plaintiff.279 However,
this David and Goliath story has now been slightly modified by the Supreme
Court. The Court's decision to allow certain claims and disallow others, based on
its interpretation of congressional intent and of the statutory preemption provi-
sions of the appropriate acts, levels the playing field for each side of the contro-
versy. The Court, in effect, seems to be sending this message: Even though
smoking's potential effects on physical health have been known for quite some
time, if cigarette manufacturers have conspired to hide health information or have
otherwise breached express warranties or intentionally misrepresented their prod-
ucts, then a plaintiff who has been injured by their products should at least be al-
lowed to prove this and recover damages if successful. Indeed, the Court seems to
be protecting both parties' interests equitably. On one hand, the Court follows the
First Circuit's philosophy in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc. 280 by interpreting
Congress's intent in drafting the federal acts as an attempt to balance public aware-
ness of smoking's hazards and national economic interests.28" ' On the other hand,
the Court also believes that manufacturers must operate within common law
boundaries. 282 If these boundaries are violated, manufacturers must be held liable
for their actions and for damages. The Court also adopts the tactic taken by the
court in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. :283 that Congress did not necessarily
intend to protect cigarette manufacturers from all tort claims, since if it had
wanted to, it could have done so by specific statutory language .284 Therefore, the
Court's approach is a strong balance that fairly guards the interests of all involved.
The Court's interpretation of the 1965 Act's preemption language regarding ad-
vertising seems reasonable in light of the specificity with which the Act was writ-
ten. The Court felt that since Congress explicitly included a provision addressing
the preemption issue and that the provision's plain language provides a reasonable
277. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)). Justice Scalia would ask if the duty imposes an
obligation due to the effect of smoking on one's health. Id.
278. Id. at 2637-38.
279. Id. at 2615. However, the $400,000 damage award was to compensate Mrs. Cipollone's husband for
losses due to the manufacturer's breach of express warranty. Id. No damages were awarded to Mrs. Cipollone
herself, since she was judged 80% contributorily responsible. Id.
280. 825 F.2d 620 (lst Cir. 1987).
281. Id. at 626 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987)).
282. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
283. 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
284. Id. at 1251.
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indication of congressional intent concerning state authority, there is no reason to
infer preemption of state laws.285 This appears to be a logical determination of
congressional intent of preemption since the provision was purposely placed in the
statute. Therefore, the 1965 Act's language preempts legislatures and administra-
tive agencies from requiring specific warning statements, but does not supersede
state law damage actions. 286 The Court seems to have wisely drawn upon the First
Circuit's analysis in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc. 287 in focusing on the Act's clear
and unambiguous language.288 In contrast to the Palmer holding, however, the
Supreme Court believes the 1965 Act does allow state common law claims to stand
by using the plain meaning of its preemption language as the key element.
2 89 Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent on this point greatly extends the plain meaning concept. His
desire to preempt common law claims under the 1965 Act is based on a much
broader interpretation of the section 5(b) language which says that" '[n]o state-
ment relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of [prop-
erly labeled] cigarettes.' "290 His rigid interpretation allows for little flexibility in
context and allows no remedy at all for consumers under the 1965 Act.291
Similarly, the Court appropriately uses the plain language approach292 to deter-
mine that the 1969 Act is much broader in scope and that, although the 1965 Act's
section 5 preemption provision was narrow and exact, the 1969 Act's section 5 ex-
tends preemption power to include both "positive enactments" and state common
law claims. 293 This time, the Court utilizes the Palmer concept of plain meaning to
hold that some common law claims are preempted by the 1969 Act, but not all.294
Thus, the Court narrowly construes the statutory preemption language of section
5(b) of the 1969 Act to determine which common law claims can stand.29s The
Court uses three phrases to determine which claims are allowed. The Court must
decide whether the duty is a " 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health . . . imposed under State law with respect to . . . advertising or
285. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992) (citing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). See
also California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497 (1978).
286. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618-19. See Cigarette Act, supra note 3.
287. 825 F.2d 620 (lst Cir. 1987).
288. Id. See Cigarette Act, supra note 3.
289. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). The Court also acknowledged the
Act's purpose of avoiding confusing labeling and advertising regulations, as well as on-going regulatory efforts.
Id. (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). It determined that "positive enactments" were superseded, but com-
mon law damage actions were not. Id. at 2619 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). By contrast, the Palmer
court used plain meaning to determine that such common law claims were not possible. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626.
290. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
291. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
292. Id. at 2620-21. The plain meaning is one approach to analyzing the statutory meaning of the words of a
statute. It takes the literal interpretation as the meaning. Id.
293. Id. at 2621. The provision held that the Act preempted" '[s]tate law with respect to advertising or promo-
tion.' "Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
294. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
295. Id. (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
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promotion.' ",296 Unlike any previous courts' analyses, the Court takes the ap-
proach of looking at each category of common law damage claims to determine if
there exists a legal duty to protect against such damage.297
The majority holds that the failure to warn claims based on omissions or inclu-
sions in advertising or promotions are preempted.298 This follows a narrow read-
ing of the language that the claims "rely on a state law 'requirement or prohibition
• ..with respect to. . .advertising or promotion.' "299 However, Justice Stevens
and the majority also leave open the validity of claims based on the manufacturers'
conduct unrelated to advertising or promotion." 0 This approach virtually elimi-
nates a plaintiffs failure to warn claims but allows flexibility for suits if failure to
warn dangers based on non-advertising activities can be proven. This may seem
like a high hurdle to clear, but a plaintiff is not entirely foreclosed from suit as a
result.
In contrast, the Court preserves the plaintiffs right, under the 1969 Act, to
bring suit for express warranty breach, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspir-
acy. According to the Court, an express warranty claim based on smoking and
health related to advertising is a "contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken"
by the manufacturer, 31 and the remedy for such a breach does not fall under state
law. The Court correctly believes this claim is valid,30 2 despite Justice Scalia's dis-
agreement and his opinion that the 1969 Act preempts the claim since an express
warranty duty arises under state law.303
Likewise, the Court correctly holds that claims of concealment of material facts
are not preempted if there exists a state law duty to disclose those facts to a regula-
tory or administrative body other than by advertising or promotion.304 Quite sim-
ply, under state law, if a manufacturer fails to disclose health risks to a responsible
agency, then liability for concealment should exist. Fraud by intentional misstate-
ment in advertising is also logically not preempted by the Court,30 5 since conduct
of that nature is one of the best examples that exists of misleading the public. The
Court's analysis of this particular claim follows very closely the court's analysis in
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 306 In Dewey, the court was certain in its inter-
pretation of the 1969 Federal Act that Congress was not intending to protect ciga-
rette manufacturers from generally fraudulent actions. In Cipollone, the Court
believes both the 1965 and 1969 Acts were designed to punish deceptive
296. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
300. Id. at 2622.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 2623.
303. Id. at 2635-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
304. Id. at 2623.
305. Id. at 2624.
306. 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
307. Id. at 1251 (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
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promotional schemes. Indeed, the Court settles on a narrow reading, similar to
Dewey, of the 1969 Act's phraseology" 'based on smoking and health' "to deter-
mine that Congress did not intend a claim based on allegedly fraudulent statements
in cigarette advertising to be preempted. 9
Finally, the Court properly recognizes that conspiracy claims are also not pro-
hibitions" 'based on smoking and health,' "similar to intentional fraud claims.
310
Conspiracy claims against the manufacturers are also allowed to stand.311
Justice Blackmun's disagreement with the majority stems from his belief that
the 1969 Act "no more. . . exhibits an intent to preempt state common-law dam-
ages actions than did the language of its predecessor in the 1965 Act."312 He be-
lieves the revised text of section 5(b) of the 1969 Act does not invite preemption,
nor is there any "suggestion in the legislative history that Congress intended to ex-
pand the scope of the pre-emption provision when it amended the statute in
1969. '"313 Justice Blackmun holds the opinion that the majority shifts its level of
generality in examining which claims are valid. 31 '4 By allowing certain claims to be
preempted, he believes the Court has damaged the States' power to protect the
health and safety of its citizens and that Congress never intended such a result.315
Justice Blackmun's contention that the majority shifts its analysis level in deter-
mining which claims can stand and which cannot may be valid. But this does not
necessarily inhibit states from protecting its citizens' health and safety. States are
still able to protect health and safety through traditional means, such as transporta-
tion and public health facilities. Arguably, States may have less parental power of
direct statutory protection regarding cigarette use, but Congress has assumed that
role by its explicit preemption language in the 1969 statute. Justice Blackmun's
opinion also fails to recognize one important decisional aspect that all citizens
make every day: freedom of choice. Citizens have the choice to smoke and if pro-
vided with federally-mandated warnings about smoking's hazards, they must ac-
cept the consequences of their actions. Although certainly not bound by them,
Justice Blackmun's approach ignores past appeals courts' decisions that were
based on some form of balancing approach (between a desire to protect the pub-
lic's interests and to protect the economy's interests), similar to the Palmer and
Roysdon opinions, as well as the fact that certain activities, such as smoking, are
known in the community to be harmful.316 Justice Blackmun's conclusion car-
ries the consumer protection concept extremely far, and leaves no room for a
308. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2624 (1992) (construing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
The Court felt Congress intended the language "relating to smoking and health" to be read narrowly. Id.
309. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
310. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
311. Id. at 2624-25.
312. Id. at 2627 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
313. Id. at 2629 (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3).
314. Id. at 2631.
315. Id.
316. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825
F.2d 620 (lst Cir. 1987).
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manufacturer to protect itself, except by the mere chance that a later court makes
its own decision that a manufacturer has lived within the letter of the federal stat-
ute completely and without fail.
In clear contrast to Justice Blackmun, Justice Scalia asserts that all claims under
both Acts should be preempted.3 17 He expresses his belief in a "proximate applica-
tion"318 theory to decide if cigarette smoking damage claims create duties" 'based
on smoking and health,' " so that the question that arises is whether a particular
duty exists because of the effect of smoking upon health.31 The result, of course,
would be complete preemption. But Justice Scalia's approach also goes too far, not
in the Roysdon balancing concept nor in the over-protection of economic interests,
but in not giving enough, if any, protection to consumers, despite their conscious
decisions to smoke. Justice Scalia too easily settles on an ordinary statutory con-
struction philosophy, without much regard for consumers' often limited informa-
tional sources regarding health. It would be difficult for a plaintiff who had
contracted lung cancer after fifty years of smoking to convince Justice Scalia that
he or she should have an opportunity to prove a manufacturer's conspiracy or in-
tentional misrepresentation in advertising. Justice Scalia's hard-line stance would
preclude any attempt of proof based on his interpretation of the federal statutes'
preemption provisions, giving consumers virtually no opportunity to protect
themselves from basic, though possibly subtle, fraud or misrepresentation, even if
they have made conscious decisions to smoke.
The majority, however, is unwilling to allow all claims to stand, nor will it allow
them all to be preempted. The Court's opinion operates as a balance between ex-
tremes by forming a compromise that protects both parties from instant loss. On
the other hand, the Blackmun and Scalia dissents discuss the plurality's decision
and its probability of creating more questions than answers. 2 But the Court has
specifically addressed the fact that if, for example, one can prove intentional fraud
by a manufacturer and if a federal statute exists that provides guidelines for prod-
uct warnings, claims can stand and recovery is possible.321 Its balanced decision
on these particular claims has been general enough so that the concepts can be car-
ried over into future products liability cases similar to Cipollone's cigarette litiga-
tion. Some claims will be completely preempted, based strictly on statutory
language, if statutes exist for those types of products. But other claims may invari-
ably be valid.
317. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2632(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (discussing Cigarette Act, supra note 3). Scalia's desire is to apply "ordinary principles of statutory con-
struction" to the text, so that the legislative purpose is more correctly carried out. Id. at 2632-33.
318. Id. at 2637 (emphasis omitted).
319. Id. (quoting Cigarette Act, supra note 3, § 1334 (1970)).
320. Id. at 2637-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
321. See id. at 2636-38.
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Indeed, the Court's decision has implications that extend beyond just cigarette
litigation. One example is physical injury from alcohol consumption. 22 A 1988
federal act, the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act, requires health warning labels to
be placed on alcoholic beverage containers., 23 This statute may be the basis behind
the next attempts toward litigation in which consumers may be embroiled. 24 Since
alcohol also has a potentially-negative physical impact on consumers' health,
plaintiffs injured by the long-term effects of alcohol consumption may be able to
learn what to expect by examining past cigarette litigation.3 2 Alcohol manufactur-
ers can also anticipate what the rules of the game might be now, by basing their
approach on the Supreme Court's Cipollone guidelines. If manufacturers follow
federal statutory mandates, plaintiffs must prove possible intent, fraud, or conspir-
acy to misrepresent in order to have a chance at recovery for health injuries. Like
the cigarette tort litigation, plaintiffs may have an uphill battle here as well.
In the same vein, cases have also arisen concerning secondhand passive smoke
injuries to third parties.326 Although most of these lawsuits are directed not at man-
ufacturers, but toward employers, the trend may be an indication that claims
against the makers are forthcoming.327 Such plaintiffs may be successful under
various claims of liability, particularly industry-wide, market share, or enterprise
theories of liability.328 However, secondhand smoke plaintiffs will likely have a
much more difficult task of proving causation and, if and when that is accom-
plished, in establishing a relationship between themselves and a manufacturer
similar to that between a cigarette smoker and a manufacturer. This direct link is
virtually nonexistent. Additionally, statutory language that covers advertising
speaks to those who use the product, not to those who do not. Their approach to
suits will necessarily have to be different than a cigarette smoker's approach be-
cause no statutory protection has been or is now in existence to protect them
as a class. At this point, secondhand smoke plaintiffs' claims against manufactur-
ers seem weak at best, especially when compared to actual cigarette smokers'
claims. Conversely, in the wake of recent Environmental Protection Agency
322. George Arthur Davis, The Requisite Specificity ofAlcoholic Beverage Warning Labels: A Decision Best Left
for Congressional Determination, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 943, 945-47 (1990).
323. Id. at 945 (citing Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 27 U.S.C. §§ 213-219 (1988)).
324. Id. at 948-50. This is due, in part, to the Act's silence on the preemption issue. Id. at 952-53.
325. Id.
326. Larry Kraft, Smoking in Public Places: Living With a Dying Custom, 64 N.D. L. REv. 329, 330 (1988).
327. Id. at 333-35. See also Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Laurel Barber's Suit Blames 2nd-Hand Smoke for Lung
Cancer, THE CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Oct. 24, 1992, at BI.
328. Bradley M. Soos, Adding Smoke to the Cloud of Tobacco Litigation-A New Plaintiff: The Involuntary
Smoker, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 111, 120-28 (1988). Under the industry-wide theory, an entire industry is held
jointly and severally liable to a plaintiff who cannot prove which defendant made and marketed the product that
caused the injury. Id. The plaintiff must also prove that all the defendants were part of an insufficient industry-
wide safety standard. Id. Under a market share theory, the liability is the same as the industry-wide theory, ex-
cept that responsibility is apportioned according to each defendant's percentage of the product market. Id. Under
the enterprise theory of liability, defendant manufacturers should bear the losses to injured smokers since the
former have some logical connection with the activity creating the losses, examples of which are most notably
cases involving asbestos-related injuries. Id.
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determinations that secondhand smoke is carcinogenic, these plaintiffs' cases may
be somewhat bolstered.329
Nevertheless, for the many hundreds of thousands of 1940s and 1950s-era
smokers who may file claims for physical damages against cigarette manufacturers
in the future, the implications of the Cipollone decision are far-reaching. The deci-
sion, at a minimum, gives them some hope of recovery; each individual's case
may be different but the chances of recovery increase dramatically if the burden of
proof can be carried to show concealment of information or fraud. On the other
hand, if manufacturers have operated according to the law, but particularly if they
have been open and not fraudulent in advertising or concealment of material
health data, their chances of success will likewise increase in weathering attacks
on them or their products.
Today, the first question that most, if not all, health insurance companies ask a
potential insured is, "Do you smoke?" In allowing a percentage discount credit off
the normal premium for non-smokers, insurance companies willingly accept more
of the risk for those whom they believe are healthier individuals. Despite this trend
by insurance companies and other large entities toward promoting healthier life-
styles, cigarette manufacturers continue to sell their products successfully and are
always assured of a fresh crop of newly-emerging smokers with each new genera-
tion. This battle for new converts is a continuing one for both sides. Likewise, the
battle within cigarette tort litigation between plaintiffs and manufacturers is one in
which there is no apparent victor -yet.
VI. CONCLUSION
The trend of federal and state government, as well as private entities, in the
United States concerning cigarette smoking restrictions in public and private
places, has prompted Europe to begin to ban smoking in public areas, particularly
government buildings and shopping centers."' It seems society worldwide is be-
ginning to strengthen its stand on the insistence of maintaining a healthful environ-
ment, including the air it breathes. Despite tobacco's stronghold on the financial
and economic assets of most technically advanced nations, society's values about
smoking, which began changing after the first assault on American tobacco com-
panies was launched in the 1950s, are becoming even stronger in the 1990s."3 ' But
like many other first attempts at challenging formidable opponents, products lia-
bility recovery for smoking-related illnesses, whether direct or passive, as well as
recovery for other products of bodily consumption such as alcohol and drugs, may
only amount to a trickle from a constricted faucet.
329. Warren E. Leary, U.S. Ties Secondhand Smoke to Cancer, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1993, at A14. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency has recently added secondhand tobacco smoke to the list of human carcinogens,
after concluding that it kills an estimated 3000 nonsmokers a year and exposes hundreds of thousands of children
to respiratory problems. Id.
330. Frances Kerry, France Gearing Up for Second Revolutions: Anti-Smoking Laws, CHI. Tin., Oct. 30,
1992, at 2. The new French law sets aside smoking areas in restaurants, factories, offices, and other public
places, and provides for fines for individual offenders of up to $260, and for businesses of up to $1200. Id.
331. See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
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Cipollone reassures consumers that today there is a much better chance than
ever to succeed in recovering damages from manufacturers due to suffering the ill
effects of smoking. Cipollone has prepared the groundwork for the next wave of
plaintiffs. The United States Supreme Court has now clarified the framework
within which plaintiffs can build their cases against manufacturers. The Court has
also provided the rule book within which manufacturers must operate. Plaintiffs'
attorneys may feel that Cipollone has given them an edge in structuring their suits,
but litigation costs may still be a limiting factor. On the other hand, manufacturers
have tremendous financial resources with which to fight. If they have nothing
fraudulent to hide, then their defenses to liability seem even stronger. Neverthe-
less, societal changes in policy values, on a scale such as this, take a long time in
coming. The first cigarette litigation cases began in the early 1950s. 332 Forty years
later no one has yet to receive one cent in damages from cigarette litigation. The
victor of this war may be simply the one who can last the longest. What remains to
be seen is whether either side will ever be able to completely claim victory.
332. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
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